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Abstract The aim of the paper is to explore the interrelation between persuasion
tactics and properties of speech acts. We investigate two types of arguments ad: ad
hominem and ad baculum. We show that with both of these tactics, the structures
that play a key role are not inferential, but rather ethotic, i.e., related to the speaker’s
character and trust. We use the concepts of illocutionary force and constitutive
conditions related to the character or status of the speaker in order to explain the
dynamics of these two techniques. In keeping with the research focus of the Polish
School of Argumentation, we examine how the pragmatic and rhetorical aspects of
the force of ad hominem and ad baculum arguments exploit trust in the speaker’s
status to influence the audience’s cognition.
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1 Introduction
The paper aims to develop a uniform account of two rhetorical techniques: ad
hominem argument (cf. Walton 1998; Załe˛ska 2011) and ad baculum argument
(cf. Walton 2000; Cap 2013). We describe them in terms of the illocutionary acts
they involve as well as in that of the speaker’s ethos, character, deontic status or
trust (Aristotle 1991; Braet 1992; Searle 2010; Witek 2013a). It is worth stressing
that the concern in this paper is with the structure of ad hominem and ad baculum
arguments and not e.g. of their fallaciousness. We further combine formal
considerations with pragmatic aspects of communication following the approach
characteristic of the research of the Polish School of Argumentation (cf. Debowska-
Kozlowska 2014; see also Koszowy and Araszkiewicz 2014; Reed and Koszowy
2011 for an overview of this approach).
Our hypothesis is that at least some aspects of the structure of these rhetorical
techniques can be best accounted for in terms of illocutionary points and ethotic
conditions rather than in terms of premises and conclusions. We also agree that they
can be naturally characterised by reference to their perlocutionary goals and
consequences. We describe ad hominem and ad baculum techniques as complex
rhetoric techniques in order to examine those aspects of their structure, functioning
and pragmatic force that can be described and explained within the framework of
speech act theory (Austin 1975; Searle 1969) (see also van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1989; Goodwin 2014; Snoeck-Henkemans 2014 for the links between
speech acts and argumentation).
2 Ad hominem Technique
Standard approaches that investigate communicative and cognitive structures
typically treat ad hominem, AH, as an inferential structure (see e.g., Walton 1998).
We claim that models which limit the representation of messages solely to their
logos-based structure in this way are not sufficient for capturing all the aspects of
AH technique (Sect. 2.1). If we want to directly describe ad hominem as personal
attack (Walton 1998, p. 23), we need an independent ethotic component to be
included, i.e., a component related to the character of the speaker and one which can
occur without the presence of any inferential structure. We propose an extension to
standard models that incorporates such a component using elements of speech act
theory (Sect. 2.2). As a result, the new model allows us to explain what exactly is
attacked by ad hominem technique (Sect. 2.3).
2.1 Standard Approaches to Ad Hominem Argument
Different types of ad hominem have been identified and there is definitely no
agreement on what really constitutes AH arguments (see e.g., Walton 1998 for an
excellent overview). In this paper, we focus on a subclass of ad hominem techniques
understood as personal attack (i.e., in which the proponent attacks the person of his
opponent rather than the content of what the opponent has said) ignoring the other
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important subclass introduced by Locke, i.e., arguments from the opponent’s
commitments (Walton 1998, pp. 21–23). Moreover, we limit our considerations to
the most basic type of AH personal attack, and start from the inferential account
proposed in (Walton 1998, p. 112), in which ‘‘bad person’’ is interpreted very
broadly, i.e., as the speaker’s deficiency with respect to, e.g., his veracity, prudence,
perception, cognitive skills, morals; (Walton 1998, pp. 250–251):
GENERIC AH ARGUMENT SCHEME
i is a bad person.
Therefore, i’s argument A should not be accepted.
When considering inferential models, we can ask where the personal attack (i.e.,
an attack on ethos) is expressed in the communicative and cognitive structure, or in
other words: whether this attack is really targeted at ethos. Consider a very simple
example of AH used in the dialogical context:
(1) a. Bob said, p
b. Wilma said, Why p?
c. Bob said, q
d. Wilma said, You know nothing about it!
Using Walton’s account, two inferential structures can be identified in (1). The first
one, A1, is delivered by Bob, and consists of the conclusion p uttered in (1-a)
supported by the premise q uttered in (1-c). The second inferential structure, A2,
will be identified in this dialogue, if we assume that Wilma’s move (1-d) is a generic
AH argument. It is not clear what exactly Wilma’s critique refers to: Bob’s whole
argument A1, the premise q, or maybe the conclusion p. Let us choose the second
interpretation for the sake of simplicity, but the same can be shown for any of
them.1 We also assume that ‘‘Bob knows nothing about it’’ constitutes an instance of
the AH premise ‘‘Bob is a bad person’’. Following Walton’s AH scheme, the
utterance (1-c) or (1-d) should be reconstructed as A2 in Table 1.
One advantage of such a representation is that it uses the relatively well-elaborated
concepts from traditional logic, i.e., it allows us to explain the AH technique in terms
of inference and contradiction. That is, we can say that when the speaker uses the AH
technique, then she infers that Bob’s argument cannot be accepted (A2’s conclusion)
using Bob’s defective ethos (A2’s premise), what in turn contradicts the acceptance of
A1’s premise and as a result undercuts Bob’s argument for p.2
Now let us return to the question we raised above: Where exactly is the attack on
ethos represented in this model? It can be said that it is captured by the contradiction
(such as the contradiction between A2’s conclusion and the acceptance of A1’s
premise in Table 1), however, observe that this attack does not aim at the
opponent’s character. The conclusion of the AH argument is attacking (contradict-
ing) what Bob said, i.e., q, rather than Bob’s character itself. We could say that the
1 In fact, it is irrelevant whether we reconstruct AH as related to q, to p, or toA1, even though the last
interpretation presents more serious technical challenges.
2 The formal representation would not, however, be trivial, for the contradiction would not be between q
and :q, but between modal statements ‘‘q should be accepted’’ and ‘‘q should not be accepted’’.
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communicative technique described by Walton does not directly describe an attack
on ethos, but rather the attack on the opponent’s logos, while having its ‘‘roots’’ in
the opponent’s defective ethos (‘‘roots’’ rather than ‘‘target’’). In other words, the
attack aims at the propositional content of the opponent’s utterance and this attack is
represented by the contradiction between (the acceptance of) this content and the
AH’s conclusion. Thus, the opponent’s character plays a role here not as an aim of
the attack, but as its justification.
2.2 Ad Hominem as an Attack on Ethos
The question we want to explore in this section is whether it is necessary to interpret
Wilma’s communicative and cognitive behaviour in (1-d) as the attempt to prove
why she does not accept q. We claim that an alternative and more straightforward
formal interpretation of her intentions is possible. That is, we could understand this
utterance as her asserting that Bob’s ethos is defective, i.e., expressing distrust in his
ethos, with respect to q as much as she could assert that he is tall, short, handsome,
ugly, blond, dark and so on. Additionally, by virtue of this specific assertion being a
response to Bob’s assertion that q—she establishes another illocutionary force of ad
hominem speech act which attacks the ethotic condition on Bob’s act (1-c), i.e.,
the ethotic condition on Bob’s asserting q.
In other words, if we want to represent ad hominem explicitly as an attack on
ethos (rather than a support of an attack on the opponent’s logos), the challenge is to
introduce the component representing the speaker’s character directly in the model
of the AH structure (Budzynska 2010). We claim that such an ethotic component
can be defined in terms of the elements of speech act theory.3 We use Inference
Anchoring Theory, IAT, (Budzynska and Reed 2011) to express inferential,
dialogical and illocutionary structures, and relations amongst them. Within this
framework, the dialogical move (1-a) is interpreted as the locution linked with its
propositional content p through the illocutionary connection associated with the
specific illocutionary force of (1-a), i.e., the illocutionary connection of asserting.
Amongst the felicity conditions of performing the speech act of asserting, there are
conditions related to the character of the speaker, i.e., in the case of (1-a), ethotic
conditions on Bob’s character such as his believing p.4
Table 1 The reconstruction of inferences in the dialogue (1) according to Walton’s model
Argument A1 Argument A2
Conclusion p q should not be accepted
Premise q Bob is a bad person
3 A speech act FðAÞ is a communicative action of uttering the propositional content p with the
illocutionary force F of asserting, questioning, arguing, promising, requesting and so on. Felicity
(constitutive) conditions determine what a speech act has to satisfy in order to have its illocutionary force
properly recognised (Searle 1969).
4 The explanatory merits of such a model was demonstrated on the example of ethotic circularity of self-
referential utterances such as: Bob said, I am credible (Budzynska 2013).
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Such ethotic conditions hold for each assertive connection including also (1-c)
(see Table 2). This means that this utterance will be a successful assertion about q as
long as we assume that Bob’s character is not in some way defective. And this is
exactly what, according to IAT, Wilma’s tries to attack in the next move. The
locution in (1-d) is linked with its propositional content ‘‘Bob knows nothing about
q’’ again via an assertive illocutionary connection (which has its own ethotic
conditions, but this time related not to Bob’s but to Wilma’s character, see the
ethotic condition on (1-d) in Table 2).5 Still the assertion (1-d) does not only convey
some information about Bob (i.e., that he does not know anything about q), but by
virtue of its being the response to Bob’s assertion (1-c), it has also the illocutionary
force of ad hominem act which establishes a relation of conflict (attack) between
(1-c)’s ethotic condition and (1-d)’s propositional content.
According to this account, the ad hominem technique is a speech act that has a
relational content (between the ethotic condition ‘‘Bob has non-defective ethos’’ in
(1-c) and the content ‘‘Bob knows nothing about q’’ in (1-d)). That is, AH is
structurally different from standard speech acts like assertion or question which
have a text unit as a propositional content. In particular, we cannot treat AH as
having the content: ‘‘Bob knows nothing about it’’, since this proposition on its own
does not constitute the AH attack. If Wilma walks into a room and says, ‘‘Bob is not
very smart’’, then this utterance will by itself not be ad hominem attack, but just
some description of Bob. It is by virtue of it being a response to something that Bob
previously said that we are allowed to interpret Wilma’s statement as an attempt to
discredit what Bob is saying by pointing at some of his ethotic deficiencies and her
distrust, i.e., as the rhetoric technique of AH personal attack.
2.3 What Specifically is Attacked by AH?
In this section we propose to account for the functioning of ad hominem acts within the
conceptual framework of speech act theory in a more detailed manner. Following
Gazdar, we take a speech act to be ‘‘a function from contexts into contexts.’’ (Gazdar
1981). In other words, speech acts are context-changing social actions (cf. Sbisa` 2002, p.
421; Debowska 2007, pp. 308–309). In particular, to make a felicitous illocutionary act
is to change or update the context of its production by bringing about certain normative
facts. To make a binding promise in uttering ‘‘I will do A’’, for example, is to turn a
context in which the speaker is not committed to perform action A into a context in
which he is committed to do A; by analogy, the issuing of a felicitous order in uttering
‘‘Do A!’’ produces the hearer’s obligation to do A, and the performing of a felicitous
assertion that p creates the speaker’s commitment to the truth the proposition that p as
well as the hearer’s right to accommodate the proposition into his belief system.6
In some cases, however, one can bring about certain normative facts indirectly,
by means of a mechanism akin to what Lewis called presupposition accommodation
5 Wilma’s ethos can be then (counter-)attacked in the next move by Bob, cf. (Budzynska and Reed
2012).
6 It is worth to stress that in this paper we adopt the institutionalist approach to the study of speech acts;
for a discussion of this approach and its alternatives (see Witek 2013b).
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(Lewis 1979) (cf. Witek 2013a). The point is that the felicity of an illocutionary act
‘‘presupposes a lot of things’’ (Austin 1975, p. 51): the felicity of an order
presupposes (in Austin’s sense) that the speaker stands in an appropriate authority
relation to his audience, the felicity of an assertion that p presupposes that the
speaker knows something about the domain to which p belongs, the felicity of a
promise made in uttering ‘‘I will do A’’ presuppose that the speaker is able to do A,
and so on. We will assume that the felicity of an illocutionary act presupposes in
Austin’s sense that the speaker has an appropriate non-defective character or, as
Searle puts it, an appropriate status function that carries certain deontic powers:
‘‘rights, duties, obligations, requirements, permissions, authorizations, entitlements,
and so on’’ (Searle 2010, p. 9). In some cases the speaker’s status, ethos and trust
can be modified indirectly by the mechanism of Austinian presupposition
accommodation: a rule-governed context-adjusting process whose function is to
repair the context of an utterance to make the utterance a felicitous performance of a
statement, order, promise, and so on (see Witek 2013a for a detailed discussion of
this topic).
Imagine, for example, that Alice, Tom and a few other people have survived a
plane crash and found themselves on a desert island. Alice says to Tom: ‘‘Go and
pick up wood’’ and Tom complies with what he is told. In other words, Tom takes
the utterance to be a felicitous order.7 One of the ethotic conditions under which the
speaker can perform a binding directive act is that she stands in an appropriate
authority relation to her audience. Therefore, the felicity of Alice’s order made in
uttering sentence ‘‘Go and pick up woods’’ presupposes in Austin’s sense that it is
part of the context that she has an appropriate status, i.e., the status that carries,
among other things, her deontic power to issue Tom binding commands. Observe,
however, that this requirement is not satisfied prior to time t at which the utterance
under discussion is produced. To note this, however, is not to say that Alice’s
utterance is an infelicitous order. If Tom complies with what he is told, he takes the
utterance as a binding command. What is more, in doing this he repairs the context
against which Alice’s utterance is to be evaluated or, in other words, accommodates
the Austinian presupposition of Alice’s directive act. As the corollary of this,
Alice’s ethotic status has been modified indirectly by the mechanism of Austinian
presupposition accommodation.
Let us go back to example (1). Observe that in making the utterance reported in
(1-c) Bob attempts to perform a binding or felicitous assertion that q. The felicity of
Table 2 The reconstruction of AH technique in (1) as an attack on the opponent’s ethos
Assertion in (1-c) Assertion in (1-d)
Content q Bob knows nothing about q
Ethotic condition Bob’s ethos Wilma’s ethos
7 One of the preparatory conditions for making a binding order in uttering ‘‘Do A!’’ is that it is not
obvious to both the speaker and the hearer that the hearer will do A in the normal course of events of his
own record (see Searle 1969, p. 66). That’s why Alice saying to Tom ‘‘Breath in!’’ cannot be said to be
making an order, and Tom who keeps breathing cannot be said to be complying with what he is told.
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such an assertion presupposes in Austin’s sense that he has an appropriate ethotic
status (and as a result - that the hearer trusts that he possesses such a status); in
particular, it presupposes that Bob knows something about the domain to which q
belongs. From the speech act theoretical point of view, the function of utterance
(1-c)—provided it is a successful assertion—is to update Bob and Wilma’s common
ground (in particular, to update the common ground representations of their
normative or deontic statuses). Note, however, that it can be updated both (1)
directly by accommodating the explicit content of utterance (1-c) and, at the same
time, (2) indirectly by accommodating the Austinian presupposition of the felicity
of Bob’s assertion.
Now we are in a position to explain the mechanism underlying the ad hominem
techniques: in uttering ‘‘You know nothing about it’’, Wilma explicitly and directly
refuses to (indirectly) accommodate the Austinian presupposition of Bob’s act and,
by the same token, implicitly and indirectly refuses to (directly) accommodate the
explicit content of his act.
3 Ad Baculum Technique
In this section, we show that not only inference (as standard models assume, see
Sect. 3.1), but also ethotic conditions on illocutionary acts and pragmatic forces
play a crucial role in the structure of ad baculum technique, AB. We take ad
baculum to be a rhetoric technique involving two illocutionary acts: a directive
act and a commissive act (Sect. 3.3). We also claim that the threat, which
according to Walton (2000)’s account is a key component of the AB technique,
can be best explained here not as perlocutionary, but rather illocutionary, act
(Sect. 3.2).
3.1 Standard Approaches to Ad Baculum Argument
Standard approaches disagree on the details of ad baculum structure, but most of
them agree that it involves inference. There is also a lot of controversy in the
literature about whether the AB technique is an appeal to force, threat, fear, or to
some combination of the above (see Walton 2000 for a comprehensive survey). In
this paper we do not address the question of which of these approaches should be
adopted to best describe ad baculum, but we discuss an alternative model to the
inferential ones using the example of AB model proposed in (Walton 2000, 2008).
Walton’s model assumes that threat appeal has an inferential structure of
argument from negative consequences (Walton 2000, p. 140). Ad baculum
argument refers additionally to the essential condition of the speech act of making
a threat: ‘‘the speaker is undertaking to see to it that the event will occur unless the
hearer carries out the particular action designated by the speaker’’ (Walton 2000, p.
128). In other words, the speaker is not only saying that the undesirable event B will
happen (as in argument from negative consequences), but he also threatens that it
will be him (the speaker) who will make it happen unless the hearer will bring about
A (Walton 2000, p. 140):
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ARGUMENT SCHEME FROM DISJUNCTIVE AD BACULUM THREAT8
Either you bring about A or I undertake to see to it that B will occur.
B is a very bad outcome, from your point of view.
Therefore, you should bring about A.
Consider the following example cited in (Walton 2000, p. 37):
(2) The robber said, Your money or your life!
The ad baculum technique used in this case could be reconstructed according to
Walton’s model as it is proposed in Table 3:
Our aim in the paper is not to analyse whether this inferential model correctly
represents ad baculum, or how to use it to evaluate the fallacious instances of the
AB technique. We rather use it as a starting point for focusing on another aspect of
the AB technique, i.e., following the idea that the use of a threat is central for ad
baculum, we want to ask two questions: (1) are there any illocutionary points
associated with threats, or are there only perlocutionary goals of persuading a
threatened person?; and (2) are there any other communicative goals of using a
threat besides an attempt to establish an inference which justifies the actions that the
threatened person should undertake? We will address these issues in the two
following sections.
3.2 Making a Threat as an Illocutionary Act
The main idea behind our non-inferential approach to the ad baculum technique is
that AB is a complex rhetoric technique which involves two ancillary and
complementary illocutionary acts, one of which is a directive (an order, command,
and so on) and the other is a commissive act of making a threat. Before we get into
the details, however, let us justify our assumption that making a threat is an
illocutionary act, i.e., the act of bringing about normative states of affairs such as
commitments and entitlements (Sbisa` 2002; Witek 2013b), rather than a perloc-
utionary act, i.e., the act of producing ‘‘certain consequential effects upon the
feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience’’ (Austin 1975, p. 101).
Table 3 The reconstruction of inferences in ad baculum in (2) according to Walton’s model
Argument A3
Conclusion You should give me money
Premise1 Either you give me money or I will take your life
Premise2 Taking your life is a very bad outcome from your point of view
8 Walton points out that the typical form of a threat is either a conditional: ‘‘If you (the hearer) don’t
carry out this action, then some bad event will happen to you’’, or its formal equivalent of disjunction:
‘‘Either you (the hearer) carry out this action, or some bad event will happen to you’’ (Walton 2000, p.
111, 126). As a result, he distinguishes two types of the AB arguments which differ with respect to the
form of its first premise (see Walton 2000, p. 142 for more details).
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For some scholars the main reason against regarding threats as illocutionary
rather than perlocutionary acts seems to be the lack of a conventional formula or
verbal pattern that could be treated as indicating the illocutionary force of making a
threat (see Walton 2000, pp. 101–128). For example, there is no performative prefix
of the form ‘‘I threaten you with...’’ with the help of which the speaker could make
explicit his intention to make a threat. Discussing the difference between the
illocutionary and the perlocutionary act, Austin observes that ‘‘the former (...) could
be made explicit by the performative formula; but the latter could not. Thus we can
say ‘I argue that’ or ‘I warn you that’, but cannot say ‘I convince you’ or ‘I alarm
you that’’’ (Austin 1975, pp. 103–104). Following this line of argument one can
observe that it is unnatural to say ‘‘I threaten you with...’’ and conclude that making
a threat, like convincing and alarming, is a perlocutionary act.
In our view, however, the performative formula criterion, though helpful, is not
decisive. More specifically, it is true that to justify the opinion that there exists an
illocutionary act type of F-ing it suffices to demonstrate that the members of some
community use the prefix ‘‘I (hereby) F...’’; the existence of such a prefix, however,
is not the necessary condition for there being the illocutionary act type of F-ing. As
Austin noted, ‘‘from the point of view of the evolution of language, the explicit
performative must be a later development than certain more primary utterances’’
(Austin 1975, p. 71). In other words, the acts of making a threat can function as
primitive illocutionary acts whose force cannot be made explicit by means of an
appropriate performative prefix. But it can be made explicit with the help of what
Strawson (1964, p. 451) called a force-elucidating comment. For example, after
saying ‘‘I will talk to your father about your bad behaviour’’ one can add ‘‘That was
a threat’’ thereby making it clear what the force of one’s act is. According to
Strawson, it is better to view such a case not as one ‘‘in which we have two
utterances, one commenting on the other, but as a case of a single unitary act’’
(Strawson 1964, p. 451). In our view, one can take such quasi-comments to be
evolutionary predecessors of many explicit performative formulas.
Let us acknowledge, therefore, that the verb ‘‘to threaten’’ cannot be used in the
context of an appropriate explicit performative prefix of the form ‘‘I (hereby) F...’’.9
Apart from this, however, it behaves linguistically as other illocutionary verbs. For
example, it can be used in the ‘‘in doing’’ constructions whose function is to report
illocutionary acts, but not in the ‘‘by doing’’ constructions that are normally used to
report perlocutionary acts. According to Austin, for example, it is natural to say ‘‘ In
saying I would shoot him I was threatening him’’ and ‘‘By saying I would shoot him
I alarmed him.’’ (Austin 1975, p. 122). What is more, the verb ‘‘to threaten’’, like
other illocutionary verbs, has its perlocutionary counterpart: one can argue and
thereby convince one’s audience, one can warn and thereby alert one’s interlocutor,
and one can threaten and thereby intimidate one’s audience.
So far we considered a possible argument against regarding threats as
illocutionary acts and argued that it is insufficient and inconclusive. Now we
would like to make a positive case for the claim that threats form an illocutionary
9 It is worth noticing, however, that according to (Austin 1975, p. 131) we ‘‘can use the performative ‘I
threaten you with’ but not ‘I intimidate you by’.’’
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act type. The main idea is that the act of making a threat, like other illocutionary
acts, can be analysed in terms of felicity conditions for the non-defective
performance of threats. According to our analysis—which is modelled on Searle’s
analysis of promising (Searle 1969, pp. 57–64) and Walton’s analysis of making a
threat (Walton 2000, 2008)—in uttering a sentence of the form ‘‘I will do A’’ in the
presence of a hearer H, a speaker S non-defectively and literally makes a threat only
if:
• Preparatory Conditions:
(1) S’s status—no matter whether it derives from S’s position in an institution
or S’s physical properties—carries the power or ability to do A.
(2) H would prefer S’s not doing A to S’s doing A, and S believes H would
prefer S’s not doing A to S’s doing A.
(3) It is not obvious to both S and H that A will occur in the normal course of
events without S’s intervention.
• Sincerity Condition: (4) S intends to do A.
• Essential Condition: (5) S intends that the utterance of ‘‘I will do A’’ places S’s
under an obligation to do A.
Following (Walton 2008, pp. 121–122), therefore, we assume that threats, like
promises, are commissive acts whose illocutionary point—specified in the essential
condition—is to undertake an obligation to perform a certain action; the only
difference lies in the fact that the action in question, unlike the promised one, is
something that the hearer would like to avoid or, more accurately, something that he
regards as bad or undesirable (we do not, however, claim that the act of threatening
is a subspecies of promising, see (Walton 2000, pp. 109–111) for the discussion). It
is also worth stressing that condition (1) imposes certain ethotic constraints on the
speaker: one cannot make a binding act of making a threat in uttering ‘‘I will do A’’
unless one is able to do A. In other words, one’s ability to do A—no matter whether
it results from one’s institutional status or one’s non-institutional properties—is
presupposed in Austin’s sense by the felicity of one’s act of making a threat and as
such constitutes one’s ethos.
3.3 Ad Baculum as an Illocutionary Act
In this section we develop an account according to which the rhetorical technique of
ad baculum involves the act of making an order and the act of making a threat.
Consider again the robber’s example (2) and also the following one:
(3) The professor said, If you don’t hand in your paper on time, I will give you a
failing grade in the course.
According to standard models—developed, e.g., by Walton—the structure of the
utterances (2) and (3) is inferential and as such involves premises and conclusions
(see Sect. 3.1).
In our view, however, this rhetoric technique has an important pragmatic
component that is not captured by the inferential approaches. We claim that this
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communicative and cognitive tactic of ad baculum is an illocutionary complex act
that can be analysed into two closely related components: (1) the directive act that
puts the respondent under the obligation to bring about A, and (2) the commissive
act that produces the proponent’s commitment to do B if the respondent fails to
bring about A.
Our hypothesis is, then, that sentences (2) and (3) can be used to make the
illocutionary AB act that involves directive and commissive aspects. Roughly
speaking, the job of the directive part of an ad baculum act is to create the
respondent’s obligation to do A, whereas the function of its commissive part is to
indicate—via the mechanism involving Austinian presuppositions (see Sect. 2.3)—
the proponent’s status function. Recall that every status function carries certain
deontic powers: ‘‘rights, duties, obligations, requirements, permissions, authoriza-
tions, entitlements, and so on’’ (Searle 2010, p. 9). In the case of AB, the status
function indicated by its commissive element carries, among other things, the
proponent’s power to give the respondent binding orders with respect to A. The
proposition ‘‘you (the respondent) should bring about A’’, which constitutes the
conclusion in the inferential approach, here becomes part of the common ground
among the participants in a dialogue in virtue of the directive act. This act is made
by the proponent whose power to make binding directive acts with respect to A is
indicated or even strengthened by his corresponding commissive act. What glues
these two acts together and makes them two complementary aspects of one
illocutionary act of ad baculum is the fact that they presuppose in Austin’s sense the
same status function or ethotic conditions imposed on the proponent.
In short, according to our model the speech acts made in uttering sentences (2)
and (3) are complex rhetoric techniques of ad baculum within which one can
distinguish two complementary aspects: a directive act made in uttering ‘‘Do A!’’,
and a threat made in uttering ‘‘I will do B’’. This structure is made explicit by the
following paraphrases:
ð2Þ0 The robber said, Give me your money or I will shoot you!
ð3Þ0 The professor said, Hand in your paper on time or I will give you a failing
grade in the course.
In our view, the illocutionary point of the ad baculum technique involves two
aspects: (1) making the respondent committed to do A by (2) getting him to
recognize the proponent’s power to make binding orders with respect to A. Part (1)
of the ad baculum illocutionary point is brought about by the directive act, whereas
part (2) is created by the complementary or ancillary act of making a threat. What
glues these two acts together is the fact that (a) the ethotic constraint on one’s
making a binding order to do A and (b) the ethotic conditions on one’s making a
binding threat to do B are carried by the same status function that can be described
as one’s standing in a certain power relation to one’s audience. For example, (a) the
robber’s power to make felicitous orders in uttering ‘‘Give me your money’’ and
(b) his power to make a binding threat in uttering ‘‘I will shoot you’’ are both
derived from his status that results from his having a gun in his hand (see Table 4).
Analogously, (a) the professor’s power to make a binding directive act in uttering
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‘‘Hand in your paper on time’’ and (b) his power to make a felicitous threat in
uttering ‘‘I will give you a failing grade in the course’’ are carried by his institutional
status as the student’s teacher.
Recall that our aim in this section is not to reject the inferential account of the AB
technique, but to develop an alternative model and use it to explain those pragmatic
and rhetorical aspects of ad baculum that can hardly be accounted for in terms of
premises and conclusions. According to our model, then, the proposition ‘‘The
respondent should do A’’ (i.e., the conclusion in the inferential approach) is
contributed to the common ground by the felicitous act of ad baculum. The job of
the threat (considered as a premise in the inferential approach) is to indicate or
communicate the proponent’s power to make the binding act. To illustrate our point,
let us consider a robber who has a gun in his hand and says to his victim:
(4) The robber said, Your money.
According to Searle—from whom we borrow this example – the robber in uttering
(4) performs a binding order. What makes the utterance of (4) a binding order is the
fact that the robber stands in a power relation to the victim or, in other words, that he
is endowed with a certain status function: the robber, ‘‘in virtue of his possession of
a gun, may order as opposed to, e.g., request, entreat, or implore victims to raise
their hands. But his status here does not derive from a position within an institution
but from his possession of a weapon’’ (Searle 1979, p. 7). In our view, the function
of the threat component of the ad baculum act made in uttering (2) can be likened to
that of the gun in the robber’s hand: it indicates the robber’s status that enables him
to make certain binding orders. The only difference lies in the fact that in the case of
the act made in uttering (2) the mechanism whereby the status is indicated involves
the communicative act of making a threat and its Austinian presuppositions.
4 Ethos as a Link Between Ad Hominem and Ad Baculum
The job of attacks on ethos and appeals to threat is to bring about certain changes in
the common ground among the participants in a dialogue. To make a felicitous
illocutionary act of ad hominem is to update the context with the proposition to the
effect that the opponent’s alleged or claimed power to make binding acts of a certain
type—e.g. assertions, directives, promises, and so on—is explicitly revoked or
rejected. A felicitous illocutionary act of ad baculum, in turn, changes a context in
which the respondent is not committed to do A into a context into which he should
do A. Our contention is that the mechanisms that are responsible for bringing about
Table 4 The reconstruction of AB technique in (2)
Directive act in (2) Commissive act in (2)
Content Give me your money I will shoot you
Ethotic condition Robber’s ethos Robber’s ethos
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such changes are not inferential. In our view, the functioning of ad hominem and ad
baculum speech acts can be best captured in terms of the conditions for their
felicitous performance—or, more specifically, by reference to the status functions or
ethos of the participants in conversation—rather than in that of premises and
conclusions.
Our non-inferential model of the AH and AB techniques has certain explanatory
merits. For example, it provides a uniform and simple explanation of situations into
which the proponent’s ad baculum is attacked by the respondent with the help of the
ad hominem technique. Consider the following talk-exchange:
(5) a. The professor said, Hand in your paper on time,
b. The professor said, or I will give you a failing grade in the course.
c. The student said, The situation has changed: you are not my teacher.
Of course one can account for the above dialogue using the standard inferential
models discussed in Sects. 2.1 and 3.1. That is to say, one can reconstruct, first, an
inference from the premise introduced in uttering (5-b) to the proposition that the
student should hand in his paper on time in (5-a) and, second, a further reasoning
that starts with a premise introduced in uttering (5-c) and ends with the conclusion
that the professor’s words should not be counted as binding ad baculum. In our
model, however, we can also say that in uttering (5-b) the professor indicates or
communicates—by exploiting the mechanisms of Austinian presuppositions—her
status function or ethos that enables her to give the student binding orders or, more
specifically, her power to order the student to hand in his paper on time.
By the same token, it is natural to say that in uttering (5-c) the student uses ad
hominem to attack the professor’s claimed status or, in other words, refuse to
accommodate the Austinian presupposition of her ad baculum act by rejecting to
trust her ethos. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of dispute which one of these two
accounts—i.e., the inferential one or the one in terms of ethotic status—is adequate.
Nevertheless, our contention is that the latter is at least an attractive alternative to
the former. What makes it attractive, we believe, is that it allows for the possibility
that at least in some cases an utterance can change the context of its production in
virtue of its illocutionary function rather than in that of its inferential potential, i.e.,
its potential to introduce certain propositions to reasoning.
5 Conclusions
The model proposed in the paper describes the pragmatic aspects (such as
illocutionary forces) and rhetoric aspects (such as ethos, status and trust) of the force
of ad hominem and ad baculum techniques rather than their inferential aspects
emphasised by standard approaches to their structures. We propose to understand
AH as an illocutionary act with pragmatic force of undercutting the opponent’s
ethos associated with a speech act performed by the opponent at some previous
move in a dialogue. Ad baculum is, on the other hand, modelled as an illocutionary
complex act involving a directive act that puts the respondent under the obligation
to bring about some action, and a commissive act that produces the proponent’s
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commitment to do something undesired by the respondent, if he fails to bring about
this action. The important ethotic nature of those rhetorical techniques manifests
itself in their harmonious coexistence, i.e., after the attempt of imposing on the
hearer to trust the power status of the performer of ad baculum, it is natural for the
threatened person to response with ad hominem in order to refuse to accept and trust
the suggested status.
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